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Lethal Pity:
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act,
Its Implications for the Disabled,
and the Struggle for Equality
in an Able-Bodied World
Mark C. Siegel*
Introduction
Everything dies. This is a fundamental truth. The maple
tree in my family's backyard will eventually grow old, and new
leaves will no longer grace its branches. My friend's cat, which is
now just a kitten, will one day stop breathing and its heart will
stop beating. On a grander scale, languages are born and forgot-
ten. Civilizations rise and decline. Even stars go nova and become
dark shadows of their former selves.
And, of course, human beings die too.
Human society has struggled with questions of life and death
since the first human beings buried one of their comrades on the
plains of Africa. It has developed intricate ceremonies and belief
systems in an attempt to lessen the cruel finality which comes
with death.' Poets and writers have written extensively about
death, some with more vitriol than others.2 Films concerning
death have permeated American culture with varying degrees of
* J.D. expected 1998, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1995, St.
Norbert College. There are many people that I must thank for seeing me through
this long journey to publication. Among them are my parents, Barbara and Char-
les, for their love and belief in me; Beth Docherty, Bonnie Kim, Anne Becker, Lisa
Hollingsworth and Marya McDonald for their superlative editorial attention; Di-
ane Coleman and Professor Susan M. Wolf for their helpful comments and guid-
ance; my nursing staff for spending those long hours in the library with me; and
Tara Bradley, Charles Whitney, and Courtney Sullivan for their invaluable friend-
ship and support. This Article is dedicated to the physicians, nurses and staff of
the University of Wisconsin-Madison Children's Hospital. Their care and compas-
sion for a very sick young man a decade ago has made so much possible for me to-
day. Thank you.
1. Examples include Catholic wakes, Jewish mourning periods, funerals,
burials, cremation, etc.
2. See, e.g., DYLAN THOMAS, Do Not Go Gentle into That Good Night, in
COLLECTED POEMS 128 (1934).
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artistic success. 3 In short, death has always been an integral part
of our collective psyche.
Recently, advances in medical technology have drastically
changed how people view life and death. Along with these scien-
tific advances come questions about what constitutes a desirable
quality of life and what it means to die with dignity. The answers
to these questions have been increasingly analyzed and intensely
debated as a result of the controversy over physician-assisted sui-
cide.4 A growing number of people who determine that their medi-
cal conditions either severely impair their perceived quality of life
or are terminal are asking their physicians to help them end their
lives.5
In response to these requests for physician-assisted suicide,
some state legislatures have attempted to legalize the practice 6 in
an effort to prevent the criminal prosecution of those physicians
who actively assist a patient in the patient's own death.7 Oregon
is the first state, however, to pass a measure legalizing physician-
assisted suicide.5 In passing the Oregon Death with Dignity Act,9
3. See, e.g., FEARLESS (Warner Bros. 1993); FLATLINERS (Columbia Pictures
1990).
4. In this Article, the term "physician-assisted suicide" is defined as the prac-
tice of physicians giving patients the means to die; it is the patient.who must per-
form the actual suicide. This is not the same thing as euthanasia. Euthanasia
occurs when the physician commits the lethal act. It should be noted that there is
an important distinction between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. Volun-
tary euthanasia occurs when the patient gives informed consent to die. Involun-
tary euthanasia occurs when the patient is unable to give consent yet is eutha-
nized regardless.
5. See, e.g., Jerald G. Bachman et al., Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and
the Public Toward Legalizing Physician-assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthana-
sia, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 303, 304 (1996) (citing a recent poll showing that 24%
of the Michigan public definitely thought they might request physician-assisted
suicide if it were available).
6. See William Carlsen, State Debate Follows Oregon Suicide Vote, S.F.
EXAMINER, Nov. 6, 1997, at Al (detailing efforts to legalize physician-assisted sui-
cide in California); Sue Ellen Christian, Right-to-Die Plan Struggling for Life, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 7, 1997, at A4 (detailing similar efforts in Michigan).
7. See Roger Worthington, Kervorkian Verdict Won't End Assisted-Suicide
Issue, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30, 1994, at 2 (detailing one of the several prosecutions of
Dr. Jack Kervorkian).
8. See David Brown, Assisted Suicide Law Splits Oregon Doctors: Tough
Rules Limit Use of Lethal Doses, CHI. SuN-TIMEs, Nov. 14, 1994, at 22
('[E]nactment ... of Oregon's 'Death with Dignity Act' represents a legal accep-
tance of physician-assisted suicide that is without precedent in the United
States.").
The Supreme Court only recently weighed in on the issue of whether a person
has a constitutionally-protected right to die in Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.
Ct. 2258 (1997). Glucksberg is the product of two related cases, Compassion in Dy-
ing v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) and Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d
Cir. 1996). In Compassion in Dying, a non-profit right-to-die group, along with
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the Oregon legislature treaded into legal waters previously unex-
plored. The ensuing controversy over this law has permeated the
nation, resulting in a fierce debate. 10
One issue inescapably linked with the physician-assisted sui-
cide debate is the impact laws such as Oregon's will have on the
lives of the disabled in America. This Article examines that issue
and draws conclusions regarding the legal and ethical implications
of physician-assisted suicide as it relates to the civil rights of the
disabled. Specifically, this Article will demonstrate that the legali-
zation of physician-assisted suicide is fraught with uncertainty
and potential for abuse. One possible result of the passage of such
legislation is that physician-assisted suicide laws will eventually
be broadened to include not only terminally ill individuals, but also
physically and cognitively disabled individuals. The notion, which
is so prevalent in American culture, that disability and a low
quality of life go hand in hand may influence disabled individuals
to choose legally-sanctioned suicide rather than attempt to live in
a society that presents a multitude of physical and social barriers
to them.
Part I of this Article discusses the treatment of the disabled
in Western society from ancient times to the modern era. Part II
provides a brief history of physician-assisted suicide and traces its
evolution in this country and others. Part III analyzes the Oregon
Death with Dignity Act, explains the important sections of this law
and describes the legal challenges it recently faced. Part IV dem-
onstrates the dangers of legalizing physician-assisted suicide and
the impact it may have on the lives of the disabled. Part V offers
numerous terminally ill individuals, successfully challenged a Washington statute
which criminalized assisted suicide. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 793-94.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the State of Washington's ban on
physician-assisted suicide was unconstitutional and a violation of due process. See
id. In Quill, another group of physicians and patients successfully challenged a
similar statute in New York. See Quill, 80 F.3d at 716. In Glucksberg, the Court
ruled that there is not a constitutional right to die. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at
2262-75.
This ruling does not mean that physician-assisted suicide is explicitly prohib-
ited. Other states are free to consider their own laws regarding physician-assisted
suicide. See id. at 2275. As the Court stated, "[t]hroughout the Nation, Americans
are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and
practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to con-
tinue, as it should in a democratic society." Id.
9. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 1-6 (1995).
10. See Brown, supra note 8, at 22 and accompanying text; Carey Goldberg,
Oregon Braces for New Right-to-Die Fight, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1997, at A12
("Oregon may become again, and with greater intensity, the principal arena in
which the thorny ethical questions surrounding [physician-assisted suicide] are
translated into a knock-down, drag-out political battle.").
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solutions and alternatives for addressing the underlying issues
surrounding physician-assisted suicide and the effect it may have
on people with disabilities.
I. The Disabled: Paternalism and Oppression
A. Angels and Demons: The Beginnings of Oppression
People with disabilities have always occupied a curious posi-
tion in Western society. On one hand, society has viewed them as
noble individuals who bear the burden of their infirmities with an
angelic countenance." On the other hand, society has regarded
the disabled as pathetic and helpless creatures who have no pros-
pects for leading normal and productive lives.12 As a result, people
with disabilities have been relegated to a secondary role in society,
a role replete with overtones of dependence, paternalism and op-
pression.'5
In ancient times, the disabled were generally treated as out-
siders.1 4 The early Christians believed that the disabled were
cursed by God or possessed by demons.1 5 The Romans, and later
the Roman Catholic Church, prohibited the disabled from serving
as priests. 16 Although Christianity later began to take a more
charitable attitude towards people with disabilities,17 the disabled
were always considered to be the "other": a foreigner and a
stranger, a tragedy in human form.' 8
11. See Searching for Sharper Images, PARAPLEGIA NEWS (Paralyzed Veterans
of Am., Phoenix, AZ), Jan. 1997, at 55, 55 ('[The] media image [of the disabled] is
still defined by telethon poster children and courageous overachievers .....").
12. See Kathi Wolfe, Ordinary People: Why the Disabled Aren't So Different,
THE HUMANIST, Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 31, 31 ("People see [the disabled] as beggars,
helpless victims, or superheroes.").
13. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
14. See HUGH GREGORY GALLAGHER, BY TRUST BETRAYED: PATIENTS, PRY-
SICIANS, AND THE LICENSE TO KILL IN THE THIRD REICH 31 (1990).
The medical historian Henry Sigerist discerned . . . differing social ap-
proaches toward the disabled: [tihe ancient Hebrews believed disability to
be caused by sin. The ancient Greeks considered it to be a matter of
status and economics-the [disabled] as social inferiors. The Christians





17. See id. at 32.
18. See STEPHEN L. PERCY, DISABILITY, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE
POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION 5 (1989) (pointing to such characters as Captain
Ahab and the Hunchback of Notre Dame as representations of the stereotypical
"evil, vengeful, and freakish" disabled individual).
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B. The Early Twentieth Century: The Nazis and Aktion T-4
When Adolf Hitler and the Nazis rose to power in Germany
during the 1930s, few people guessed how their actions would for-
ever alter the debate on euthanasia and assisted suicide. Hitler
possessed a vehement contempt for the disabled.19 In his book
Mein Karnpf, Hitler wrote that his Third Reich "must take care
that only the healthy beget children; that there shall be but one
thing shameful: to be sick and ailing, and nevertheless to bring
children into the world."20 This violent hatred of the "inferior" and
the "genetically tainted" directly resulted in the forced sterilization
of 375,000 people between 1933 and 1939; people who were physi-
cally disabled, mentally ill or challenged, deaf, blind, alcoholic or
who otherwise did not meet Hitler's specifications of a healthy Ar-
yan.21 Yet this was only a precursor to the killing that would fol-
low.
In September 1939, Hitler signed a secret order that marked
the beginning of the systematic extermination of the physically
and mentally disabled in Germany.22 The killing program was
known as Aktion T-4.23 Aktion T-4 was a quintessential example of
Nazi brutality combined with the efficient bureaucracy of the
Third Reich. Ironically, the Holocaust began where one might
least suspect: in the hospitals.24 The Nazis transported "qualified"
patients by bus from hospitals to killing centers scattered across
Germany. 25 Once the patients arrived at the killing centers, the
Nazis brought them to a shower room and told them to wash after
the long journey. 26 After the Nazis herded the patients into the
showers, a nurse closed the door and the head physician of the fa-
19. See GALLAGHER, supra note 16, at 52.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 53.
22. See id. at 45-46. The order, written on Hitler's personal stationary, stated
that "persons who, according to human judgment, are incurable can, upon a most
careful diagnosis of their condition of sickness, be accorded a mercy death." Id.
Hitler actually backdated the order to September 1, 1939, the day Germany in-
vaded Poland. See id. at 45. This was done to give the killing program the status
of a wartime order. See id. Hitler intended to formally legalize the program after
the war. See id.
23. See id. at 57. The moniker "T-4" came from the address of the villa which
served as the base of operations for the program: Tiergartenstrasse 4, Berlin,
Germany. See id.
24. See id. at 13.
25. See id. at 11; 60 Minutes: Herr Doktor (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 20,
1996) (describing the methods used by the Nazis to facilitate Aktion T-4)
[hereinafter 60 Minutes].
26. See GALLAGHER, supra note 16, at 13.
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cility pushed a button to release carbon monoxide into the room,
which killed the unsuspecting patients. 27
The Nazis killed between 100,000 and 200,000 people28 before
Aktion T-4 ended in 1941. The Nazis officially discontinued the
program because of growing public protest over the Nazis' treat-
ment of the disabled, but unofficial killing continued until the end
of the war in 1945.29 This widespread extermination of Germany's
disabled population is still a relatively unknown chapter of his-
tory,30 despite the well-known history of the holocaust of Jews,
Gypsies, homosexuals, and political dissidents.3 1
C. Modern Times
In modern times, the disabled continue to exist outside of
mainstream society. Much of this isolation is due to society's im-
plicit and persistent rejection of the disabled.32 These attitudes
stem from several sources. One source is the depiction of the dis-
abled in literature and media.33 Other sources include social
norms, child-rearing practices and deep-seated psychological fears
or anxieties. 34
The discrimination arising out of these prejudices affects
nearly every aspect of disabled people's lives. They are denied ba-
sic human traits as a result of society's fears and misconceptions.
The mainstream culture, for example, commonly assumes that the
disabled are devoid of sexuality and sexual characteristics. 35 Sur-
veys on sexuality generally ignore issues relating to the disabled. 36
One study indicates that society has disapproving, or even nega-
27. See id. at 14-15. During the Nazi's official euthanasia stage, carbon mon-
oxide was the killing method, but after this official stage, the killings continued by
the method chosen by each facility's medical director. See id.
28. See DEREK HUMPHRY & ANN WICKETT, THE RIGHT TO DIE: UNDERSTANDING
EUTHANASIA 20 (1986) (asserting that approximately 100,000 people were killed
due to Aktion T-4); 60 Minutes, supra note 25 (stating that over 200,000 people
were killed as a result of Aktion T-4).
29. See GALLAGHER, supra note 14, at 15.
30. See id. at 5 ("The world has largely ignored the issue of what the German
physicians did to their patients during World War II.").
31. See id. at 51-53; 60 Minutes, supra note 25.
32. See Wolfe, supra note 12, at 31 (citing a recent Harris poll which showed
that 47% of Americans are fearful of the disabled).
33. See PERCY, supra note 18, at 5.
34. See id. at 5-6 (citing a review of studies that examined the formation of at-
titudes toward disabled people).
35. See Yvonne Duffy, Our Sexual Rights, INDEPENDENT LIVING, Sept. 1992, at
65, 68 ("[M]ost of society continues to view [the disabled] as asexual").
36. See JOHN GLIEDMAN & WILLIAM ROTH, CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON CHILDREN,
THE UNEXPECTED MINORITY: HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN AMERICA 364 (1980).
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tive, attitudes towards the disabled expressing their sexuality. 37
Until very recently, physicians had even suggested that individu-
als with disabilities be sterilized when they reached adolescence. 38
Various reasons have been cited for society's perception of the dis-
abled as asexual or impotent.39 These include misconceptions that
the disabled are unable to be intimate because they are locked in a
perpetual "childlike" state and that they cannot participate in sex-
ual activity for health reasons.40
Other facets of the disabled person's life are affected by soci-
ety's attitudes as well. The disabled person's effort to find em-
ployment is frustrated by employers' reluctance to hire such indi-
viduals because employers fear that special accommodations will
be required or that the disabled worker will not be as productive as
a "normal" worker. 41 It is estimated that sixty-six percent of dis-
abled individuals aged sixteen to sixty-four were unemployed in
1985.42 Internationally, the unemployment rate for disabled per-
sons is two to three times higher than it is for other persons. 43
Federal and state legislatures have passed significant legisla-
tion since the 1970s that has benefited the disabled. These institu-
tional changes have varied widely, from the provision of desig-
nated parking spots for the disabled 44 to federally-mandated
programs designed to curb discrimination against the disabled.45
37. See PERCY, supra note 18, at 6 (citing a study of sexually-liberated college
students).
38. See, e.g., GLIEDMAN & ROTH, supra note 36, at 365 (relating an instance
when a physician recommended to the mother of a child with Down's Syndrome
that the child should be sterilized once she began to menstruate).
39. See id. at 365-66.
40. See id.
[Tihe [disabled] role represents the culturally prescribed 'solution' to the
misfortune of suffering from a condition that supposedly renders one in-
definitely childlike. Perceiving the [disabled] as sick, it is only natural for
the able-bodied to believe that they are either incapable of sex because of
the 'illness,' or that they should not engage in sex because ... sexual in-
dulgence can slow or even prevent recovery.
Id.
41. See PERCY, supra note 18, at 194 (attributing employers' reluctance to
"common myths and misunderstandings, which include the ideas that the em-
ployment of disabled persons will increase insurance and workers compensation
costs, cause higher absenteeism among employees, reduce productivity, harm the
morale and productivity of [non-disabled] workers, and require costly accommoda-
tion measures.").
42. See id. at 8.
43. See LEANDRO DESPOUY, UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABLED
PERSONS 26 (1993).
44. See, e.g., MINN STAT. § 169.345 (1996) (creating parking privileges for the
physically disabled).
45. See infra notes 46-48.
Law and Inequality
The major federal programs which are meant to assist the disabled
include the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,46 the Individuals with Dis-
abilities Education Act 47 and, perhaps the most significant piece of
federal legislation affecting disability rights, the Americans with
Disabilities Act. 48 Although these federal acts have had a dra-
matic impact on the lives of the disabled and have allowed them to
achieve limited integration into mainstream society, 49 they have
not been enough to alter society's invidious discrimination against
people with disabilities. 50
These factors contribute to the social and physical isolation of
the disabled. The disabled are forced into a dependent role that
inhibits their social development and casts them into a paradigm
that is more paternal than rehabilitative. As the authors of one
book state, "[the disabled] do not develop sociologically; they re-
main 'unstuck in time', citizens of a therapeutic state where there
are only good patients and bad patients, not grown-ups and chil-
dren."51
This is simply a brief overview of how the disabled have been
treated in Western civilization, particularly the United States.
Volumes have been written about the sociology and psychology of
disability and it is not this author's intention to reiterate the find-
ings of others. 52 It is critical to understand the disabled experience
in order to see how the legalization of assisted suicide and eutha-
nasia will result in the continued devaluation of people with dis-
abilities. As one author puts it: 'When society pities and fears per-
sons with disabilities to the extent that suicide is considered a
46. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1994) (prohibiting dis-
crimination against the physically and mentally disabled in any program which
received federal funding).
47. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1970, 20 U.S.C § 1400
(1994) (requiring that every disabled child receive "a free appropriate public educa-
tion" regardless of the nature of his or her disability).
48. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-13 (1994).
The ADA significantly expands upon the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. It prohibits
discrimination against the disabled in the private sector and explicitly covers em-
ployment, transportation and public accommodations. See id. §§ 12112, 12141-65,
12182-84.
49. See Ruth Freedman & Sheila Fesko, The Meaning of Work in the Lives of
People with Significant Disabilities: Consumer and Family Perspectives, 62 J.
REHABILITATION 49, 49 (1996) ("Since the passage of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act and the Rehabilitation Amendments of 1992, there has been increased
public attention to the employment of people with disabilities.").
50. See id. at 54.
51. GLiEDMAN & ROTH, supra note 36, at 261.
52. See, e.g., LEONARD J. DAVIS, ENFORCING NORMALCY: DISABILITY,
DEAFNESS, AND THE BODY (1995); DISABILITY AND SOCIETY: EMERGING ISSUES AND
INSIGHTS (Len Barton, ed., Longman 1996).
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rational choice, it is difficult to expect that same society will have
enough respect to treat such persons as truly equal."53 The pity
and fear are important components of a potentially deadly equa-
tion. An analysis of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia in
relation to society's attitudes about disability will reveal the sum
of that equation.
II. Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia: A Historical Overview
Understanding the history of the right-to-die movement
sheds light on its motivations and how it has achieved such wide-
spread acceptance in American culture and around the world.
A. A Historical Perspective
Physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia are nothing new to
human civilization. 54 The ancient Greeks had a strong tradition of
embracing euthanasia55 and hastening death.56 Plato criticized the
medical profession in his Republic for "educating diseases ... and
inventing lingering death."57 The Stoics also thought highly of sui-
cide, killing themselves for such minor physical maladies as a
wrenched finger or an abscessed gum. 58 The Romans also viewed
suicide as an acceptable means of ending a terminal illness or es-
caping dishonor. 59 By Medieval times, attitudes had changed, and
suicide was strongly discouraged. The Christian Church con-
demned it as a crime, denying funeral rites to anyone who volun-
tarily ended his or her own life. 60
It was not until the Age of Enlightenment that attitudes re-
garding euthanasia began to shift again. 61 Secular individuals, at
least, no longer viewed suicide and euthanasia as evil acts worthy
53. Paul Steven Miller, The Impact of Assisted Suicide on Persons with Dis-
abilities-Is it a Right Without Freedom?, 9 ISSuES L. & MED. 47, 49 (1993).
54. See, e.g., HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 28, at 3-19 (1986) (providing a
brief overview of the treatment of euthanasia throughout history and across cul-
tures).
55. The word "euthanasia" derives from the Greek language. See id. at 3
(explaining that eu means "well" and thanatos means "death").
56. See id. at 3-4 ('Chen suicide was state approved, it was not only encour-
aged but endorsed. In Athens ... magistrates kept a supply of poison for anyone
who wished to die.") "For the Romans and Greeks, dying decently, rationally,
and-not least-with dignity mattered immensely." Id. at 6.
57. Id. at 4.
58. See id. at 4-5.
59. See id. at 5.
60. See id. at 6.
61. See id. at 10 (stating that Rousseau used the term "virtuous suicide" to de-
scribe the suicide of those who were suffering and wasting away).
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of condemnation. Francis Bacon argued that physicians should as-
sist patients "to make a fair and easy passage from life."62
The belief that a physician should relieve a patient from pain
and suffering by means of euthanasia gained even wider accep-
tance during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 63 Doctors
viewed euthanasia as a means of ending the suffering of the incur-
able and the terminally ill;64 they believed they helped their pa-
tients by ending their lives in a humane manner.65
The effort to legalize assisted suicide and euthanasia contin-
ues today, both in the United States and around the world. 66 At
least two countries, the Netherlands and Australia, have taken ac-
tive measures to legalize euthanasia and physician-assisted sui-
cide. 67 Although the Netherlands has allowed euthanasia and
physician-assisted suicide by judicial decision since 1985,68 the
Dutch parliament adopted a law legalizing it in February 1993.69
Prior to the adoption of the law, euthanasia and physician-assisted
suicide existed in a semi-legal limbo70 without an explicit statute
or law recognizing it. Previously, the Dutch Supreme Court had
essentially granted physicians the power to determine if and when
it was appropriate to help a patient end his or her life. 71 As a re-
sult, the criteria for euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide
62. Id. at 8.
63. See id. at 10 (citing an oral thesis delivered by Carl F.H. Marx entitled
"Medical Euthanasia," in which Marx "insisted that the physician 'is not expected
to have a remedy for death, but for the skillful alleviation of suffering, and he
should know how to apply it when all hope has departed."').
64. See id. at 11 (citing an 1889 speech to the Maine Medical Association where
a physician reminded his colleagues that they should not ignore the needs of the
terminally ill and that such suffering should be relieved).
65. See id. "The concept of physical and mental pain ... was considered by
physicians and writers as a possible justification for ending one's life." Id.
66. See, e.g., Richard Bernstein, French Doctors Say They Helped Patients Die,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1984, at A19; Martin Walker, U.S. Court Legalises Euthana-
sia, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 8, 1996, at 3.
67. See Seth Myans, Legal Euthanasia: Australia Faces a Grin Reality, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 1997, at A3 (explaining that both Australia and the Netherlands
have permissive laws concerning euthanasia).
68. See John Keown, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slip-
pery Slope?, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y. 407, 410 (1995) (citing to
Alkrnaar, 106 NJ 451 (H.R. 1985), the relevant court decision).
69. See Netherlands' Parliament Votes to Allow Mercy Killings, MINNEAPOLIS
STAR-TRIB., Feb. 10, 1993, at 1A (stating that the law "brings the practice [of
euthanasia] out of the dark and into the open").
70. See Keown, supra note 68, at 411 ("It is not even possible precisely to iden-
tify the legal criteria, let alone define them: the Supreme Court did not lay down a
precise list and lower courts have issued sets of criteria which are far from congru-
ent.").
71. See id. at 407.
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were extremely vague. Despite the lack of legal clarity, euthana-
sia and physician-assisted suicide accounted for approximately
1.8% of all deaths each year in the Netherlands.7 2 This prevalence
of euthanasia, along with public approval of the practice,73
prompted the adoption of the law.74 The twenty-eight-step guide-
lines require the patient to repeatedly request euthanasia of his or
her own free will, to be informed about his or her condition and
about alternatives to euthanasia and to 'experience his or her suf-
fering as perpetual, unbearable and hopeless."'75
Unlike the Netherlands where judicial opinion has allowed
physician-assisted suicide, Australia's Northern Territory passed a
law in 1995 that permits physicians to actively assist patients to
die.7 6 But physician-assisted suicide did not last long in Australia;
the law was repealed in March 1997. 77
In the United States, efforts to legalize physician-assisted
suicide have gained momentum in recent years.7 8 Organizations
such as the Hemlock Society and the Society for the Right to Die
have substantial memberships.7 9 These groups have a strong
presence on the Internet,8 0 and the Hemlock Society actively lob-
72. See Ute Angelique Joas, Physician-Assisted Lethal Injection vs. the Plastic
Bag: Will Euthanasia Legislation Ever Conte? A Comparison of Standards in the
Netherlands and the United States, 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 365, 370 (1992)
(citing the Remmelink Report written by a government-appointed commission
which examined the impact of euthanasia in the Netherlands). According to the
Remmelink Report, doctors in the Netherlands "complied with approximately 2300
euthanasia requests and assisted 400 suicides out of 130,000 deaths each year."
Id. at 370 n.42 (citing Right to Die, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 11, 1991, at 9).
73. See Netherlands' Parliament, supra note 69, at 15A ("About 80 percent of
the Dutch people approve of euthanasia for the terminally ill, a recent opinion poll
indicates.").
74. See id. at 1A (noting that the law "legally acknowledg[es] a practice that
has been quietly accepted for years").
75. Id.
76. See THE LAST RIGHT?: AUSTRALIANS TAKE SIDES ON THE RIGHT TO DIE ix
(Simon Chapman & Stephen Leeder eds., 1995). The official time and date of pas-
sage was 3:15 A.M. on May 26, 1995, evidence that the law had controversial be-
ginnings. See id.
77. See Australia Strikes Down Assisted-Suicide Law, USA TODAY, Mar. 25,
1997, at A6.
78. See Goldberg, supra note 10, at A12 (noting that the legalization of physi-
cian-assisted suicide in Oregon will be closely watched in other states that will face
the issue).
79. See Joas, supra note 72, at 380. The Hemlock Society has approximately
40,000 members while the Society for the Right to Die has an estimated 200,000
members. See id. (citing a 1990 source).
80. See, e.g., Euthanasia Research & Guidance Organization, Euthanasia
World Directory (visited Sept. 13, 1997) <http://www.efn.org/-ergo> (listing links
to various right-to-die topics and issues); Physicians for Mercy (visited Sept. 13,
1997) <http://www.rights.org/-deathnet/kevorkianguidelines.html> (listing
guidelines approved by an organization of Michigan doctors and specialists for
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bies for legislation that would enable patients to end their lives
with the legal aid of their physicians.8 1
III. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act and the Battle in
Court
A. The Legislation
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act82 (ODDA) was passed in
1994.83 Also known as Measure 16,84 Oregon voters passed it with
only fifty-one percent of the vote.8 5 Its passage made Oregon the
first state to legalize physician-assisted suicide. 86 In November
1997, Oregon voters defeated a referendum to repeal the Act by
sixty percent to forty percent.8 7
The ODDA has three major sections: requirements, safe-
guards, and immunities.8 8 The requirements section explains how
a physician may properly assist in a patient's suicide.8 9 Two phy-
sicians must determine that a patient is terminally il190 before the
patient may make a request for his or her attending physician to
prescribe a lethal dose of medication.9 ' It is important to note that
the physician does not actually administer the lethal dose; the pa-
physician-assisted suicide). Organizations that oppose physician-assisted suicide
and euthanasia also utilize the Internet to support their movement. See, e.g., Not
Dead Yet (visited Sept. 19, 1997) <http://www.acils.com/NotDeadYet> (webpage for
an organization of disability activists who oppose assisted suicide and euthanasia).
81. See Joas, supra note 72, at 380.
82. OR. REV. STAT. §§1-6 (1995).
83. See Suit Challenges Assisted-Suicide Law in Oregon, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25,
1994, at A26 (citing the date of passage).
84. See Carey Goldberg, Oregon Braces for New Right-to-Die Fight, N.Y. TIMES,
June 17, 1997, at A12.
85. See Brown, supra note 8, at 22.
86. See id.
87. See Timothy Egan, The 1997 Elections: Right to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
1997, at A26 ("In a huge turnout, perhaps the biggest in 34 years, about 60 percent
of this state's voters rebuffed an effort to repeal the nation's first assisted suicide
law.").
88. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 2-6 (1995).
89. See id. §§ 2-3.
90. See id. § 1.01(12) ("A terminal illness is defined as an incurable and irre-
versible disease that has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable
medical judgment, produce death within six (6) months.").
91. See id. § 2.01. The section states in full:
An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been determined
by the attending physician and consulting physician to be suffering from a
terminal disease, and who has voluntarily expressed his or her wish to
die, may make a written request for medication for the purpose of ending
his or her life in a humane and dignified manner in accordance with this
Act.
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tient must commit the final act.92 The physician provides the pa-
tient with the means to end his or her life. 93
The second section of the ODDA establishes procedures and
safeguards.94 The patient must follow a specific procedural process
to obtain the lethal medication. 95 The patient must make an ini-
tial oral request to his or her attending physician asking for a le-
thal dose of medication for the purpose of ending his or her life.
96
The oral request must be followed by a written request and a sec-
ond oral request, both within fifteen days of the original oral re-
quest.97 Only after these steps have been followed may the at-
tending physician prescribe the lethal dose. 98
There are several safeguards in the ODDA designed to pre-
vent abuse of the Act. One safeguard is the written statement that
requests assistance to die, which must be signed by two witnesses
as well as the patient.99 Furthermore, the law limits the ability of
certain people to serve as witnesses. 0 0 The patient has the oppor-
tunity to rescind his or her request for assistance to die at any
Id.
92. See id. § 3.01(9) ("The attending physician shall... writ[el a prescription
for medication to enable a qualified patient to end his or her life in a humane and
dignified manner.") (emphasis added).
93. See id. It is interesting that the Oregon Legislature categorizes the ODDA
as something other than physician-assisted suicide. See id. § 3.14. "Actions taken
in accordance with this Act shall not, for any purpose, constitute suicide, assisted
suicide, mercy killing or homicide, under the law." Id. The attending physician
supplies the lethal dose necessary for the patient to die, yet the State of Oregon
does not consider the physician to be assisting in the suicide. Nevertheless, for the
purposes of this Article, the ODDA will be treated as a form of physician-assisted
suicide. This is because the physician plays an integral part in giving the patient
the means to end his or her life. If the physician does not provide the patient with
the means to commit suicide, the patient is forced to find other means of suicide.
Essentially, the physician is the instrument which hastens death and is therefore
assisting the patient's suicide.
94. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 3.01-14 (1995).




99. See id. § 2.02(1). The section reads:
A valid request for medication under this Act shall be in substantially the
form described in Section 6 of this Act, signed and dated by the patient
and witnessed by at least two individuals who, in the presence of the pa-
tient, attest that to the best of their knowledge and belief the patient is
capable, acting voluntarily, and is not being coerced to sign the request.
Id.
100. See id. §§ 2.02(2)(a)-(2)(c). Among those individuals excluded are relatives
of the patient, people who stand to inherit any portion of the patient's estate, and
any individuals connected to the health care facility where the patient is receiving
treatment or is a resident. See id.
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time. 101 In addition, the physician must provide the patient with
an opportunity to rescind after the second, and final, oral re-
quest.102
There are additional safeguards worth noting. The attending
physician must refer the patient to a consulting physician to con-
firm the terminal diagnosis and to ensure that the patient is acting
voluntarily. 10 3 Either the attending physician or the consulting
physician may refer the patient to counseling if he or she feels that
the patient is suffering from a psychiatric or psychological illness
or depression. 104 The attending physician must ask the patient to
inform relatives of his or her decision to die, although the patient
may refuse. 105 The attending physician must fully document the
patient's medical condition and prognosis, as well as all of the pa-
tient's written and oral requests "to end his or her life in a humane
and dignified manner." 106 The physician must also inform the pa-
tient of possible alternatives to suicide. 0 7
Finally, the third section of the ODDA creates specific immu-
nities and liabilities.10 8 Concerning immunities, the ODDA ex-
plicitly states that "[n]o person shall be subject to civil or criminal
liability or professional disciplinary action for participating in good
101. See id. § 3.07.
102. See id. § 3.06.
103. See id. § 3.02.
104. See id. §3.03 (stating that no lethal doses of medication may be prescribed
until it has been determined that the patient is not suffering from a "psychiatric or
psychological disorder, or depression causing impaired judgment"); see also Ed-
ward J. Larson, Prescription for Death: A Second Opinion 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 461,
469 (explaining that 90-100% of suicide victims suffer from depression, and noting
that two to four percent of all suicide victims were terminally ill at the time of
their death).
105. See id. § 3.05 ("A patient who declines or is unable to notify next of kin
shall not have his or her request denied for that reason.").
106. Id. § 3.09(1). In addition, the physician must note that he or she offered
the patient the opportunity to rescind the request and that all requirements have
been met. See id. The physician must also note the outcome of any counseling
provided, the steps taken to carry out the patient's request and the medication
prescribed. See id.
107. See id. § 3.01(2)(e). Possible alternatives listed in this section include hos-
pice care and pain control. See id. Hospice care is usually done in the home or a
hospice facility and serves to help the patient deal with the dying process. See,
e.g., Hospice: A Better Way to End a Life, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., May 28, 1997,
at 10A (describing how hospice care prepares individuals to confront death). Pain
control involves the administration of medication (such as morphine) or other
techniques to manage the severe pain of some terminally ill individuals. See, e.g.,
Gordon Slovut, Cancer Pain is Manageable, Specialist Says, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-
TRIB., Oct. 15, 1994, at 4B (quoting a pain-management expert as stating that the
"pain of terminal cancer can be made bearable or eliminated in almost every pa-
tient").
108. See id. §§ 4.01-02.
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faith compliance with this Act. This includes being present when a
qualified patient takes the prescribed medication to end his or her
life in a humane and dignified manner."'109 Furthermore, no
health care professional may be censured or have his or her license
revoked for participating in accordance with the Act." 0
The Act also specifies liabilities for any participating physi-
cian or health care professional."' Any person who forges a pa-
tient's request to die or exerts undue influence or coercion with the
intent to end a patient's life shall be guilty of a Class A felony un-
der Oregon law."12
B. The ODDA and the Courts
Soon after Oregon voters approved the ODDA, the Act was
challenged in court."13 In August of 1995, a federal district court
ruled in Lee v. Oregon"14 that the ODDA violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the U.S. Constitution." 5 Under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, the state may differentiate between some classes of
persons as long as the classification is related to a legitimate state
interest." 6 In Lee, the plaintiffs claimed that Oregon discrimi-
nated between the terminally ill and the non-terminally ill without
a legitimate state interest." 7 Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed
that the ODDA denied the protection of Oregon laws"18 to the ter-
109. Id. § 4.01(1).
110. See § 4.01(2).
111. See id. § 4.02 (listing civil and criminal sanctions available under the stat-
ute).
112. See id. §§ 4.02(1), 4.02(2); OR. REV. STAT. §161.605(1) (1996) (stating that
the maximum punishment for a Class A felony is twenty years imprisonment).
113. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995) (stating that the plain-
tiffs were a group of terminally ill patients and their physicians, all of whom op-
posed the new law); see also Suit Challenges Assisted-Suicide Law in Oregon, su-
pra note 83.
114. 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995).
115. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (requiring that no state "deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
The Equal Protection Clause and its relation to physician-assisted suicide will
be discussed later at greater length. See infra Part IV.B. A basic understanding of
equal protection analysis, however, is necessary to appreciate the constitutional
problems inherent to physician-assisted suicide.
116. See, e.g., Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 165 (1897) (holding that
a classification must be "based upon some reasonable ground--some difference
which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification-and is not a
mere arbitrary selection").
117. See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1431, 1433. The plaintiffs also claimed that the
ODDA violated the First Amendment right to freedom of religion and the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act. See id. at 1431. However, the district court only ad-
dressed the equal protection issue. See id. at 1437.
118. These laws included OR. REV. STAT. § 426.070 (1996), which establishes the
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minally ill."9 The court determined that there was no rational
relation 20 between certain safeguards of the ODDA and a legiti-
mate state interest.' 21 Specifically, the court referred to § 3.01 of
the ODDA, which makes the attending physician the person re-
sponsible for determining a patient's mental condition. 122 The
court found that there was no mandate for the attending physician
to seek the opinion of a trained psychiatrist or social worker before
prescribing the lethal dose of medication for the patient.123
The ODDA safeguards that prevent a terminally ill individ-
ual from committing suicide differ from the civil commitment proc-
ess in which a suicidal, non-terminally ill individual is judged to be
competent or incompetent. 24 In Oregon civil commitment pro-
ceedings, a trained mental health professional assesses the pa-
tient's mental status. 25 The ODDA, however, does not require
such an assessment. The Lee court concluded that it was "unable
to conceive of a set of facts [in the physician-assisted suicide con-
text] under which it would be rational to not require mental and
social evaluations by appropriately trained professionals."'126 In
the eyes of the court, the status of a person as "terminally ill"
should not prevent him or her from receiving the same protections
as healthy individuals (namely, an assessment by a psychiatrist or
social worker). 127
procedure for the civil commitment of mentally ill persons.
119. See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1438.
120. For a classic example of rational basis review, see Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), which held that New York City could ban
advertisements displayed on vehicles where the advertising is unrelated to the
business for which the automobile is used.
121. See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1431 n.2, 1437. The District Court examined the
issue using rational basis review because the plaintiffs argued the Act was not ra-
tionally related to a legitimate state interest, but the court did not specify a level
of scrutiny to be applied in the future to the issue of assisted suicide. See id.
122. See OR. REV. STAT. § 3.01(4) (1995) (stating that the attending physician
shall "[rlefer the patient for counseling if appropriate pursuant to Section 3.03").
123. See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1434 ('The problem is that the procedures de-
signed to differentiate between the competent and incompetent are not suffi-
cient.").
124. See id. at 1434 (describing the various commitment procedures of the state
of Oregon).
125. See OR. REV. STAT. § 426.110 (1995) ('The judge shall appoint one qualified
examiner" who must be either "[a] physician licensed by the Board of Medical Ex-
aminers for the State of Oregon who is competent to practice psychiatry" or who is
"[c]ertified as a mental health examiner qualified to make examinations for invol-
untary commitment proceedings by the Mental Health and Developmental Dis-
ability Services Division.)
126. Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1436.
127. See id. at 1438.
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The court then turned its attention to the "good faith" section
of the ODDA.128 Normally, the conduct of physicians in Oregon is
measured against the general standard of care expected of physi-
cians "in the same or similar circumstances in the [medical] com-
munity of the physician."129 In contrast, the ODDA simply re-
quires the attending physician to act in good faith under the
law. 30 Therefore, the court decided that the ODDA creates the in-
ference that it is irrelevant whether the physician acts reasonably
and cautiously, or callously and negligently. 1 1 According to the
court in Lee, there is no rational justification for a difference be-
tween the standards expected of a physician treating a healthy in-
dividual and a physician treating a terminally ill patient.13
2
In its conclusion, the court stated, "[the ODDA] withholds
from terminally ill citizens the same protections from suicide the
majority enjoys." 133  It also declared that in matters concerning
physician-assisted suicide, "[the] 'good results' [of ending the suf-
fering of some competent, terminally ill persons] cannot outweigh
other lives lost due to unconstitutional errors and abuses."
134
The court issued an injunction that prevented any portion of
the ODDA from taking effect. 13 5 As a result, the ODDA was not
utilized for nearly three years. In early 1997, the Court of Appeals
of the Ninth Circuit vacated the lower court's ruling after finding
that the plaintiffs lacked standing. 36 The Supreme Court of the
United States settled the legal battle, at least temporarily, when it
allowed the Ninth Circuit's decision to stand.137
128. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
129. See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1436.
130. See OR. REV. STAT. § 4.01(3) (1995).
131. See Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1437.
132. See id. ("The court finds that there is no set of facts under which it would
be rational for terminally ill patients under Measure 16 to receive a standard of
care from their physicians under which it did not matter whether they acted with
objective reasonableness, according to professional standards.").
133. Id. at 1438.
134. Id. at 1439.
135. See id. This has been followed by renewed opposition to the ODDA in other
arenas. In April 1997, the Oregon Medical Association voted to denounce the
ODDA after assuming a neutral stance on the issue for the previous three years.
See Goldberg, supra note 84, at A12. The Oregon Legislature returned the issue to
the voters in November 1997 for a new vote. See Egan, supra note 87, at A26. The
law was upheld with 60% of the vote. See id.
136. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382, 1390 (9th Cir. 1997).
137. See Linda Greenhouse, Assisted Suicide Clears a Hurdle in Highest Court,
N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 15, 1997, at Al (explaining the Court's decision and describing
how it is consistent with the Court's opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.
Ct. 2258 (1997), in which the Court decided there is no constitutional right to die).
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This did not settle the issue of the ODDA's final status. In a
second referendum prompted by efforts to repeal the ODDA, Ore-
gon voters upheld the law by a significant majority.138
IV. Analysis
A. The Disabled and the Courts
In Lee v. Oregon,139 the district court found the ODDA uncon-
stitutional as a violation of equal protection. 140 Lee did not specifi-
cally address how the ODDA may affect the disabled. The court's
analysis, however, can be extended in order to illustrate how the
Equal Protection Clause is a double-edged sword in the context of
the relationship between physician-assisted suicide and the dis-
abled.
Although Oregon is the first state to legalize physician-
assisted suicide by statute, in recent years the courts and society
have permitted people with severe disabilities to commit suicide. 14 1
In Bouvia v. Superior Court, 42 a young woman named Elizabeth
Bouvia sought a court order to require a local hospital to adminis-
ter morphine to her while she starved herself to death. 43 Bouvia
was twenty-eight at the time and had severe cerebral palsy which
had left her a quadriplegic. 144 She had suffered many personal
setbacks, including desertion by her husband, a miscarriage and
the inability to find the means to live independently after her par-
ents were no longer able to care for her. 145 As a result of these
personal tragedies, Bouvia admitted herself to a hospital for the
purpose of starving herself to death.146
138. See Egan, supra note 87, at A26.
139. 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995).
140. See id. at 1438.
141. See infra notes 150-157.
142. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. App. 1986).
143. See id.; Diane Coleman, Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatment from Peo-
ple with Severe Disabilities Who Request It: Equal Protection Considerations, 8
ISSUES LAW & MED. 55, 55 (1992).
144. See Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
145. See id. at 300.
146. See id. Some might argue that Bouvia's request for the withholding of
medical treatment differs substantially from the Oregon Death with Dignity Act's
provision, which actively assists the individual to die (passive euthanasia versus
active euthanasia). This author regards the difference as insignificant and irrele-
vant. The state must endorse the killing for either method to be without criminal
liability. Also, the result is the same whether by act of commission or omission.
This Article focuses more on state endorsement of euthanasia rather than a spe-
cific method of suicide. The Oregon Death with Dignity Act is simply one example
of state action.
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The California Court of Appeals granted Bouvia her request
to die, stating that the "quality of her life has been diminished to
the point of hopelessness, uselessness, unenjoyability and frustra-
tion."147 The court reasoned that it would be unbearable for Bou-
via to bear the perceived indignities of her disability for the rest of
her life. 148 Thus, the court concluded that Bouvia had the right to
die as an extension of her constitutional right to privacy.
149
In McKay v. Bergstedt,150 the Nevada Supreme Court granted
permission for a thirty-one-year-old quadriplegic, Kenneth
Bergstedt, to have his ventilator turned off.151 The court's opinion
described his situation as being "imprisoned by paralysis" and as
requiring "a total dependency upon others."'152 The opinion also
stated that situations similar to that of Bergstedt's "may rob life of
much of its quality."153
Similarly, in Georgia v. McAfee, 154 a Georgia court allowed a
quadriplegic, Larry McAfee, to have his ventilator turned off.
155
The liberty interest in the right to refuse medical treatment that will pro-
long life has been established. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261 (1990) (affirming the right to refuse medical treatment). It is beyond the scope
of this Article to specifically address and refute the asserted liberty interest in the
right to actively seek death. It is this author's belief, however, that the refusal of
medical treatment, at least in the case of severely disabled persons, is by implica-
tion a form of suicide, rather than a "natural death," as some would believe. The
reasons for this will be addressed in the sociological analysis section of this Article.
See infra Part IV.C.
147. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rprt. at 304.
148. See id. at 305.
Although alert, bright, sensitive, perhaps even brave and feisty, she must
lie immobile, unable to exist except through physical acts of others. Her
mind and spirit may be free to take great flights but she herself is impris-
oned and must lie physically helpless subject to the ignominy, embar-
rassment, humiliation and dehumanizing aspects created by her helpless-
ness.
Id.
149. See id. However, Bouvia eventually chose not to die. See Coleman, supra
note 143, at 56. ("[B]y the time the appellate decision was handed down, Ms. Bou-
via's suicidal crisis had passed, and she did not carry out her plan of self-
starvation."); Miller, supra note 53, at 58 n.43 (explaining Bouvia's eventual deci-
sion not to die).
150. 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
151. See id. Kenneth Bergstedt had been a quadriplegic and ventilator-
dependent since the age of 10. Apparently, he had spent most of the intervening
21 years in bed, watching television, reading and working with a voice-operated
computer. His father had been his primary caretaker. When his father developed
a terminal illness, Kenneth decided that he would rather die than be "under the
care of strangers." Id. at 624.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 621.
154. 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989).
155. See id.
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The court stated that there was "no hope that Mr. McAffee's condi-
tion will improve with time, nor is there any known medical
treatment which can improve his condition."'156 In other Western
countries, family members who assist disabled people in dying
have been granted great leniency in court, with physician-assisted
suicide advocates calling for "tolerance" and "understanding."'157
Essentially, the courts grouped these disabled plaintiffs into
the same category as the terminally il1.158 It is likely that if the
plaintiffs had inot been disabled and had petitioned the court for
sanctioned suicide, 159 they would have received suicide prevention
counseling. 60 Because of their disabilities, however, the courts
saw them as beyond any hope of having a decent quality of life and
as being kept alive by "extraordinary" means. 161
Consider the following hypothetical. A young man in his
twenties, named Smith, becomes a quadriplegic after a diving ac-
cident. He is completely dependent on others for his care and daily
needs. He is despondent and petitions the court to allow his physi-
cian to administer a lethal dose of medication to end his life.
Smith lives in the fictional state of Polygon. The Polygon Legisla-
ture has recently passed an act which is exactly like Oregon's
156. Id.
157. See HUMPHRY & WICKETT, supra note 54, at 160.
158. See Deel v. Syracuse V.A. Medical Ctr., 729 F. Supp. 231 (N.D.N.Y.1990)
(ruling that a man with cancer has the right to be removed from a ventilator);
Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (R.I. 1988) (ruling that a woman who is in a per-
manent vegetative state has the right to have her feeding tube removed). Note
that these decisions draw no distinction between the terminally and non-
terminally ill.
159. Again, the distinction between suicide and "passive euthanasia" has no
meaning when it comes to people such as McAfee and Bergstedt. They are not
terminally ill in any sense of the term. With proper care and equipment they
could lead long and productive lives. See, e.g., John R. Bach & Margaret C. Tilton,
Life Satisfaction and Well-Being Measures in Ventilator Assisted Individuals with
Traumatic Tetraplegia, 75 ARCHIVES OF PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 626
(1994) (explaining that people who are ventilator assisted as a result of traumatic
injury are generally satisfied with their lives). When someone on a ventilator
chooses to have it turned off, it is the same thing as asking a doctor to administer
a lethal injection. Both actions interrupt life and cause death artificially. It
should not matter that a disabled person relies on mechanical aids such as a ven-
tilator or feeding tube.
160. See JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A
NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 260 (1993) ('A nondisabled man who asked the state
to help him take his life would get suicide-prevention counseling ... ").
161. See Coleman, supra note 143, at 65. Coleman criticizes the new definition
of "natural death" for persons with disabilities by positing that such quality-of-life
judgments devalue those individuals who require mechanical assistance to live.
See id. Coleman hypothesizes that the same definition could eventually apply to
people who require dialysis, pacemakers or insulin, implying that these types of
medical assistance are not typically thought of as "permanently disabling." Id.
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Death with Dignity Act. The citizens of Polygon are much more
complacent than those in Oregon, however, and the law does not
face any legal challenges.
Smith bases his request to die on the Polygon Death with
Dignity Act, but his attorney reminds him that the PDDA only ad-
dresses the terminally ill, as does the ODDA.162 The young man
decides that this classification is unreasonable and a violation of
his equal protection rights. He challenges the PDDA in court,
raising an equal protection claim and a demand for relief. His ba-
sic assertion is that the distinction between the terminally ill and
the non-terminally ill is not rationally related to any legitimate
state interest. 163 He claims he should not be denied the right to
die simply because his disability is not terminal.
Will his legal challenge be successful? The United States Su-
preme Court has struck down other classifications which it deemed
to be unreasonable. 164 Smith could argue that a distinction be-
tween the terminally ill and the disabled is also unreasonable.
Smith might point out that the quality of life of a terminally ill in-
dividual and a severely disabled person such as himself is the
same, and, therefore, the state has no legitimate reason to differ-
entiate between the two classes. In Smith's mind, his potential for
achievement and productivity might seem as limited as someone
with a terminal illness. Why should the state of Polygon prevent
him from dying when it is perfectly legal for his neighbor with
pancreatic cancer to request physician-assisted suicide?
The court hearing Smith's case might agree with him and ful-
fill Smith's death wish. After all, the Supreme Court has already
ruled that the disabled are not a suspect class and are therefore
not worthy of heightened protection. 165 Classifying the disabled as
a suspect class, however, would not ensure that laws such as the
162. See OR. REV. STAT. § 1.01(12) (1995).
163. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949)
(holding that New York City could ban advertisements displayed on vehicles where
the advertising is unrelated to the business for which the automobile is used).
164. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(striking down a city zoning regulation which prevented the establishment of a
community residence for the mentally disabled); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976) (holding that an Oklahoma law prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males
under 21 but not to females between 18 and 21 was constitutional); Weinberger v.
Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (striking down a Social Security regulation which
delivered benefits to a widow and her children if the father died, but gave benefits
only to minor children if the mother died).
165. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 (applying a rational basis test, or, at best, a
heightened rational basis test); Amy Scott Lowndes, The Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990: A Congressional Mandate for Heightened Judicial Protection of
Disabled Persons, 44 FLA L. REV. 417, 435 (1992).
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Polygon Death with Dignity Act would be considered inapplicable
to those with disabilities. When it comes to the nexus between the
disabled and legalized physician-assisted suicide, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is the quintessential double-edged sword.
B. A Legal Perspective-Equal Protection
The only Supreme Court decision to rule on the equal protec-
tion status of disabled Americans is Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center.166 The Court justified its decision by stating that the men-
tally disabled are a large and diverse class with widely varying
needs and determining how the disabled are to be treated is such a
"technical" question that only legislatures are competent to deal'
with the matter. 67 Nevertheless, the Court also noted that there
continues to be "irrational prejudice against the mentally re-
tarded,"'168 and that there is a "history of 'unfair and often gro-
tesque mistreatment' of the mentally disabled. 69 It seems that
the Court wants to have it both ways; it is reluctant to grant quasi-
suspect classification to the disabled but realizes that there has
been serious and invidious discrimination against the disabled. 170
As a consequence of this failure to recognize the disabled as a
suspect class, the hypothetical Smith is in murky legal territory
when a court considers his petition to die. It is possible, indeed
likely, that the court will consider his petition as a request to ter-
minate his suffering rather than as a request to commit suicide. 171
This type of judicial treatment of disabled persons who request
suicide is not without precedent, as discussed above.172
Herein lies the paradox. The Equal Protection Clause, de-
signed to protect citizens from discrimination, is currently null and
void when it comes to protecting the rights, indeed the very lives,
166. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne specifically concerned individuals with cog-
nitive disabilities, but legal experts generally agree that the Court meant to deny
quasi-suspect classification to all persons with disabilities. See Lisa A. Montanaro,
The Americans with Disabilities Act: Will the Court Get the Hint? Congress' At-
tempt to Raise the Status of Persons with Disabilities in Equal Protection Cases, 15
PACE L. REV. 621, 641 (1995) (discussing how Cleburne applies to all persons with
disabilities).
167. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442-43.
168. Id. at 450.
169. Id. at 438 (quoting Cleburne Living Ctr. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191,
197 (5th Cir. 1984), affd in part and vacated in part, 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
170. For an excellent critique of the Court's indecisive approach to legal protec-
tion for the disabled, see Lowndes, supra note 165.
171. See Coleman, supra note 143, at 56 ("When considering requests for assis-
tance in dying by persons with severe disabilities, other courts have made the
same 'it's not suicide' determination.").
172. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal.Rptr. 297 (Cal. App. 1986).
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of the disabled. Ultimately, the Equal Protection Clause could be
used as an instrument to expand assisted suicide laws to apply to
non-terminal but disabled individuals. In this current legal para-
digm, it is conceivable that our fictional Smith could be successful
in his request to die and that pieces of legislation, such as the
ODDA, could be expanded to meet the needs of people similarly
situated to Smith.
Rather than protecting the disabled from the dangers of phy-
sician-assisted suicide, the Equal Protection Clause could serve as
an instrument for hastening the deaths of severely disabled indi-
viduals. Laws such as the ODDA apply only to people who are
terminally ill, but this definition could easily be expanded to in-
dude people with disabilities. Ironically, granting suspect classifi-
cation to the disabled would possibly make it easier for disabled
individuals to claim that they are entitled to the benefits of laws
such as the ODDA, benefits already enjoyed by the terminally
ill.173
C. Quality of Life-A Social Perspective
There are numerous reasons why the disabled are automati-
cally equated with the terminally ill. Often a disability is seen as a
sickness rather than an integral part of the individual.174 For
many, the concepts of "disability" and "dignity" are impossible to
reconcile. 175 It is a deep-seated belief in nearly every human cul-
ture that physical or mental imperfection is something to be
ashamed of, a trait that is a signifier of inherent inferiority.
176
Many aboriginal cultures put this belief into practice by abandon-
ing, or even killing, their disabled brethren.177 In modern Western
cultures, particularly the United States, the disabled are regarded
with ambivalence. 178 For example, a 1969 study showed that
173. As noted earlier, courts must closely scrutinize any law which might have a
discriminatory effect on a suspect class. See supra note 175. Assuming the dis-
abled are granted suspect classification, the government must present a compel-
ling reason why the disabled are excluded from physician-assisted suicide laws
rather than a simply rational justification. This heightened judicial scrutiny could
very well extend such laws to the disabled.
174. See Miller, supra note 53, at 52.
175. See id. at 53.
176. See id. at 54. ("Society has a rigid code of acceptable norms in which dis-
ability, as a visible difference, is assumed to be a sign of inferiority.").
177. See GALLAGHER, supra note 14, at 28-30. Gallagher describes how the
Inuit killed their deformed children, as well as the infanticide practiced by the
Masai. See id. at 28-29. However, not all aboriginal cultures mistreat their dis-
abled. For example, among the Dahomeans of Western Africa, "the state consta-
bles are selected from persons with deformities." Id. at 29.
178. See id. at 34. ("American society has both positive and negative feelings
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ninety-three percent of the sample population would accept a
physically-disabled person as a work partner, but only seven per-
cent would accept that same physically-disabled person as a mar-
riage partner. 179
This ambivalence has resulted in societal treatment of the
disabled that is well-intentioned yet patronizing and dehumaniz-
ing. American society decided in the 1800s that its cripples should
not be forced to beg on the streets; instead, it sent them to institu-
tions where they were brutalized and isolated from mainstream
society.18 0 When the disabled began to attend public schools, they
were usually sent to segregated schools where they had little or no
contact with able-bodied children and where they received a sub-
standard education. 181 When it was time to enter the work world,
the disabled were relegated to sheltered workshops, 82 performing
menial tasks, or else they did not work at all. In nearly every facet
of life, the disabled were forced to accept the role of second-class
citizens.
As a result of this ambivalence, past and present, the dis-
abled have incorporated the mainstream's distorted view of what it
means to be disabled 8 3 Is it any wonder, in a culture that is so
disapproving of disability, that President Franklin D. Roosevelt
chose to disguise his paraplegia? 18 4 As one commentator notes, for
persons who acquire a disability later in life "internalization of so-
ciety's prejudice [about disability] is especially present."'18 5 This is
because that individual has spent his or her entire life accepting
about the disabled.").
179. See id. at 36.
180. See WILLIE V. BRYAN, IN SEARCH OF FREEDOM: How PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES HAVE BEEN DISENFRANCHISED FROM THE MAINSTREAM OF AMERICAN
SOCIETY 7 (1996) ("[Slome families with members who had a disability considered
the most appropriate action was to send them to an institution and keep them
away from the public.").
181. Cf. Mike Ervin, Getting Tough on Kids in Wheelchairs, THE PROGRESSIVE,
Nov. 1995, at 27 ('States had been shirking their responsibilities so that about a
million disabled kids were receiving no education at all, let alone a segregated, in-
ferior one.").
182. See generally Marvin Rosen et al., Sheltered Employment and the Second
Generation Workshop, 59 J. REHABILITATION 30 (1993) (explaining the history of
sheltered workshops).
183. See Miller, supra note 53, at 54. "The prejudice inflicted by society not only
causes the community to consider life with a disability as undignified but often
forces upon the disabled individual the same set of mores." Id. In other words, the
person with the disability accepts and internalizes these stereotypes, creating a
cycle of self-hate and self-pity in the disabled community. See id.
184. See generally HUGH GREGORY GALLAGHER, FDR'S SPLENDID DECEPTION
(1986) (describing Franklin Roosevelt's efforts to hide his disability from the media
and the general public).
185. Miller, supra note 53, at 54.
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the stereotypes and prejudices regarding the disabled.1 86 Indi-
viduals with congenital disabilities, however, are just as likely to
internalize society's views of the disabled. 8 7 In a culture that
links disability with helplessness and inferiority, it is nearly im-
possible for people with disabilities to avoid accepting these domi-
nant stereotypes. 188
It is at this point, when the disabled person accepts society's
prejudices, that we cross over into potentially lethal territory. The
disabled person begins to grow tired of having to overcome every
obstacle presented by an able-bodied society. Frustrations range
from finding an accessible apartment to obtaining attendant care
from an unsympathetic medical bureaucracy. 189 The phenomenon
of increasing frustrations and growing feelings of hopelessness is
sometimes referred to as "disability burnout."'190 The disabled per-
son begins to consider suicide as a rational alternative to the daily
struggles of living in an able-bodied world. In the case of Larry
McAfee, he grew tired of being shuttled from nursing homes in
Georgia to Ohio to Alabama. 191 The depression he felt as a result
of these events led to his wish for death. He was quoted as saying,
"You reach a point where you just can't take it anymore." 192
The fact that many disabled individuals must rely on federal
assistance programs such as Medicaid does not make matters eas-
ier. Many states are drastically cutting back these programs as
cost-saving measures, 193 which has the potential of causing many
disabled individuals to lose any sense of independence they
have. 194 Disabled individuals who were previously able to live in
186. See id.
187. See id. (CWith society continually reinforcing its values through discrimina-
tory cultural practices, it becomes difficult for a person with a disability, whether
acquired or congenital, not to accept that stigmatized value system.").
188. See id. ("People with disabilities are taught that the reason for their exclu-
sion is their own inferiority.").
189. See infra notes 193-194 and accompanying text.
190. SHAPIRO, supra note 160, at 261, 264 (quoting clinical psychologist Carol
Gill).
191. See id. at 285 ("[McAfee] still was destined to bounce from one nursing
home to another .... ").
192. Id. at 262. McAfee, like Bouvia, ultimately chose not to commit suicide,
however, and at last report was living independently. See id. at 288.
193. See, e.g., Ruth Conniff, Banishing the Disabled Wisconsin Caps Home-Care
Reimbursement, THE PROGRESSIVE, Mar. 1996, at 20 (describing how Wisconsin
placed caps on community-based services that fund many home care programs,
leaving many disabled individuals facing the dire possibility of entering a nursing
home).
194. See id. at 21 ("But there's an awful lot of young people who are going to be
hurt by it .... They're just getting started, going back to school. They're in their
own apartments and now they have to give that up.").
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the community may be forced to make the transition to an institu-
tional setting. Many will feel overwhelmed by this loss of freedom
and will be unwilling or unable to find substitute care from family
or friends. If the disabled are not given the means to live digni-
fied, independent lives, some may choose to commit suicide. 195
The desire for death is compounded by society's tolerance and
support for such a decision.196 The judge who initially heard McAf-
fee's request to die ruled that turning off his ventilator would sim-
ply allow the "injury process to take its natural course."'197 The
judge equated living with a ventilator to having a life devoid of any
meaningful quality.198 The same reasoning is found in McKay v.
Bergstedt.199 There, the Nevada Supreme Court characterized
Bergstedt's assisted ventilation as an "artificial life support sys-
tem[ ] or some form of heroic, radical medical treatment."200 Both
of these courts were apparently unaware of the fact that approxi-
mately 15,000 Americans live with a ventilator, 20 1 many of whom
hold jobs and raise families. 20 2
The disabled are therefore caught in a vicious cycle, which
can only be made more dangerous with the addition of legislative
acts such as the ODDA. Society constantly reinforces the stereo-
type that living with a disability is undignified and pathetic.
20 3
Disabled individuals internalize these beliefs and begin to view
themselves with pity and self-loathing.204 Some may choose death;
if there are laws in place which permit physician-assisted suicide,
195. See supra notes 187-188 and accompanying text (discussing disability
burnout).
196. See Miller, supra note 53, at 52. "Thus, when a person 'chooses' death over
an 'undignified' life with a disability, the system sympathizes with that individ-
ual's plight and supports his right to die, assuming his disability is the root of his
supreme despair." Id.
197. SHAPIRO, supra note 160, at 269.
198. See Georgia v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989) ("According to the record
there is no hope that Mr. McAfee's condition will improve with time, nor is there
any known medical treatment which can improve his condition."); supra notes 154-
156 and accompanying text (reviewing the McAfee case).
199. 801 P.2d 617, 622-23 (Nev. 1990).
200. Id. at 624.
201. See SHAPIRO, supra note 160, at 260.
202. See, e.g., John R. Bach & Denise I. Campagnolo, Psychosocial Adjustment
of Post-Poliomyelitis Ventilator Assisted Individuals, 73 ARCHIVES OF PHYSICAL
MED. & REHABILITATION 934, 939 (1992) (stating that 39% of 148 sampled ventila-
tor assisted individuals were married and 42% of 395 sampled ventilator assisted
individuals were gainfully employed).
203. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
204. See BRYAN, supra note 180, at 91 ("[F]eelings of inferiority and unworthi-
ness are projected to the public by the person with a disability reinforcing societal
attitudes.").
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then the process will be that much easier. The courts, already ex-
pressing the belief that life with a severe disability is a life not
worth living, will likely interpret these laws to include the dis-
abled. 205 Eventually, there could come a time when the disabled
are euthanized without the individual even requesting death. For
example, the family of a nonverbal boy with severe cerebral palsy
might be able to request the euthanization of their child by point-
ing to his poor quality of life and the incredible burden he places
on the family. The child will be unable to speak for himself and
the courts might be all too willing to side with the parents. The
sociology and psychology of disability may take a dark and lethal
turn.
This concern is a realistic one; the scenario described above
has already occurred. In the Netherlands, where physician-
assisted suicide is permitted, there have been at least a thousand
cases in which a doctor terminated a patient's life without receiv-
ing an explicit request from the patient.20 6 Of the physicians who
euthanized a patient without permission, thirty-one percent stated
that they did so because the patient had a "low quality of life."
20 7
This trend has dangerous implications for the disabled. Dutch
doctors are said to have "the duty to terminate meaningless
lives."208 This puts added pressure on the disabled and their fami-
lies. Individuals with disabilities might be seen as a burden to
their families as well as a drain on society's resources. Thus, phy-
sician-assisted suicide creates an economy of death where a per-
son's worth is measured in terms of saved expenses. 20 9 What has
already happened in the Netherlands could very well take place in
the United States as laws like the ODDA take effect.
V. Solutions: A Road to Integration
If the disabled are to become a valued population in Ameri-
can society, free from the dangers of physician-assisted suicide,
two courses of action must be taken. The first involves structural
changes in society to deter individuals with disabilities, especially
those who acquire their disability later in life, from considering
suicide in the first place, and the second involves changing how
disabled individuals view their role in society.
205. See supra Part IV.A.
206. See Keown, supra note 68, at 426.
207. Id. at 428.
208. Miller, supra note 53, at 55.
209. As mentioned earlier, some states are already cutting back on services for
the disabled. See supra notes 193-194 and accompanying text.
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As noted above, many people with disabilities experience
isolation as a result of physical and psychological barriers that
prevent them from engaging in social and recreational activities.2 10
According to a Harris poll, "seventeen percent of disabled people
had not eaten a meal in a restaurant, although only [five] percent
of nondisabled people had avoided dining out."211 Fifty-nine per-
cent of the disabled fear going out in public because they are afraid
of being mistreated.212 Forty-nine percent said that their local
public transit systems were inaccessible. 2 13 Physical barriers must
be removed, as the ADA requires, 214 in order to give the disabled
better access to the mainstream culture. If physical barriers are
removed, psychological barriers will dissolve as the able-bodied
population has more frequent contact with the disabled. Studies
have shown that where the disabled are in a position to have
regular interaction with mainstream society, many of the preju-
dices about the disabled become less pronounced. 215
Gainful employment is another structural area that must be
addressed. Currently, many people with disabilities live in pov-
erty because they are unable to find employment. Twenty-three
percent of the disabled live with annual incomes between $7,501
and $15,000.216 Seventeen percent earn even less. 217 Many dis-
abled individuals are forced to live on public assistance. 218 Con-
tributing to the problem is the fact that many disabled persons do
not have the necessary education to find a decent job. Twenty-five
percent of the disabled have never finished high school, and only
sixteen percent have finished college. 21 9
One reason that many disabled people consider suicide is be-
cause they feel worthless and devalued because they are unable to
find employment. 220 Employers must begin to realize that the dis-
abled can be productive and valuable assets. The educational sys-
210. See supra Part I.C.
211. See SHAPIRO, supra note 160, at 106.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(iv) (1997) (requiring places of public accommo-
dation to be free of architectural barriers).
215. See GALLAGHER, supra note 14, at 37 ("Observational studies of children
and adults interacting with disabled children in the familiar surroundings of
home, neighborhood, and integrated schoolrooms indicate that these negative per-
ceptions can be changed.").
216. See BRYAN, supra note 180, at 18.
217. See id.
218. See supra notes 193-194 and accompanying text.
219. See BRYAN, supra note 180, at 16.
220. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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tern must make a greater effort to give the disabled the skills they
need to survive and prosper in today's economy.
Yet another structural change involves reshaping attitudes
about disability in the legal and medical professions. We have al-
ready seen the pity and disgust expressed by many judges when
confronted with a severely-disabled individual. 2 1 Many health
professionals have similar misconceptions about disability and
quality-of-life issues.222 It is these same people who might one day
expand physician-assisted suicide to include the disabled. There-
fore, it is essential that those in the legal and medical communities
receive the necessary education to inform them that disability is
not a biological prison. Rather, it is a way of life that can be full of
joy and accomplishment when those individuals are given the nec-
essary tools and skills, such as assistive technology and attendant
care.
The second course of action concerns how the disabled view
their role in society. There must be an end to the self-pity and
self-hate that is so prevalent in the disabled community. 223 For too
long, the disabled have internalized society's prejudices and ac-
cepted those views in silence. 224 Disability should not be seen as a
sign of weakness and inferiority. Most disabled people will tell you
that it is not the disability itself that is the problem, but society's
construction of disability.2 25 It is up to the disabled themselves to
tear down this construction and build a new one; one where the
foundation is not composed of pity, but of tolerance and accep-
tance.
Conclusion
It is difficult to visualize an assisted suicide law which would
not pose a threat to the lives of disabled persons, especially the se-
221. See supra note 151 and accompanying text; text accompanying notes 152-
153.
222. See, e.g., John R. Bach, Ventilator Use by Muscular Dystrophy Association
Patients, 73 ARCHIVES OF PHYSICAL MED. & REHABILITATION 179 (1992) (stating
that 60 of 167 MDA clinics discouraged the use of mechanical ventilation and that
clinic directors significantly underestimated the life satisfaction of those who were
ventilator assisted); see also Amici Curiae Brief of Not Dead Yet and American
Disabled for Attendant Programs Today in Support of Petitioners at 21, Quill v.
Vacco, - S. Ct. - (1997) (No. 95-1858) ("As long as society, including medical pro-
fessionals, demonstrates ignorance and prejudice regarding the lives of people with
disabilities, no safeguards [regarding physician-assisted suicide] can be trusted to
contain the torrent of discrimination that will be unleashed by lifting the ban on
assisted suicide.").
223. See supra text accompanying notes 185-186.
224. See id.
225. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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verely disabled. To varying degrees, measures like the ODDA,
coupled with societal views of the quality of life of disabled people,
inherently impede the efforts of the disabled to integrate them-
selves into society. By contributing to an atmosphere where the
lives of the disabled already are devalued and placed in jeopardy,
such laws invariably implicate equal protection concerns. This Ar-
ticle has provided one possible framework for addressing the
problem. The Supreme Court has not ended the debate, and many
states are struggling with the issue even as this article is being
written. The passage of laws such as the ODDA should be of great
concern to the disabled as they struggle to take their rightful place
in mainstream society.
